Logic and Language

Proper Names

Do proper names have a sense as well as a reference?

Essential Reading

- Gottlob Frege, "On Sense and Reference", *Philosophical Review*, vol. 57 (1948), pp. 207-30
- John Searle, "Proper Names", *Mind*, vol. 67 (1958), pp. 166-73
- Saul Kripke, *Naming and Necessity*, Blackwell (1980)
- Gareth Evans, "The Causal Theory of Names", *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, supplementary volume 47 (1973), pp. 187-208

Additional Reading

- Tyler Burge, "Reference and Proper Names", *Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 70 (1973), pp. 425-39
- Nathan Salmon, "How to Become a Millian Heir", *Noûs*, vol. 23 (1989), pp. 211-20
- Peter Millian, "Content, Thoughts, and Definite Descriptions", *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, supplementary volume 6 (1990), pp. 167-203, section 5
- Francois Recanati, "Mental Files and Identity", in Reboul (ed.), *Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Kevin Mulligan* (2011)

Past Paper Questions

- 2003, Q3: How should we explain the fact that some identity statements are informative, and others are not?
- 2005, Q7: Do "Tully is an orator" and "Cicero is an orator" express the same belief?
- 2005, Q10: Can proper names be analysed as descriptions?
- 2006, Q14: Does the name "Aristotle" have a sense?
- 2007, Q1: Do proper names have a sense as well as a reference?
- 2007, Q17: What role, if any, do causal relations play in determining the referents of proper names?
- 2008, Q5a: Does the claim that proper names are rigid designators pose a challenge to the claim that they have a sense?
- 2009, Q2: Are there any reasons to think that the meaning of a proper name cannot be given by a rigidified definite description such as "The actual teacher of Alexander"?
- 2011, Q3a: Are names disguised definite descriptions?
- 2012, Q13: Is identity a relation between names?
- 2012, Q14a: Do proper names and definite descriptions ever mean the same thing?